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WILLIAM HOWARD TAFf LECTURE
PRESIDENTS WITHOUT MANDATES (WITH SPECIAL
EMPHASIS ON OHIO)
Akhil Reed Amar·
Advocate, judge, scholar, diplomat, and President-William Howard
Taft packed at least five grand careers in the law into one life. A single
lecture in honor of so large a man could travel a long way in any
number of directions, and yet stay close and true to him. This day, I
shall take my cue not just from the man, but from the place. Ohio is, or
at least for much ofour history has been, the home of Presidents. This
place invites us to ask not simply about what one does as President, but
also about how one becomes President. The specific story of Taft's
ascension might make for a fine tale, but it has been well told
elsewhere. l Today, I shall try to offer a different, more general, story
focusing on those who (unlike Taft) came to the Presidency without a
direct and personal mandate from the American electorate.
Before I plunge into my tale, let me note some of the roads I shall not
travel. William Howard Taft became a state judge at the age of twenty-
nine, the Solicitor General of the United States at thirty-two, a federal
CircuitJudge a couple of years later, and eventually, of course, Chief
Justice of the United States.2 A lecture commemorating this part of his
extraordinary life might reflect on his greatest judicial opinion, Myers v.
United States3-the subject ofJustice Scalia's Taft Lecture;4 or on Taft's
overall legacy as Chief Justice-the subject of Judge McGowan's
Inaugural Taft Lecture;5 or on the more general topic of judicial
review-the subject ofSenator Hatch's Taft Lecture;6 or on the role of
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This address was delivered on October 28,
1998, at the University ofCincinnati College ofLaw as the William Howard Taft Lecture on Constitutional
Law.
I. The standard biographies include the following: HENRy F. PRINGLE, THE UFE AND TIMES OF
WlLllAM HOWARD TAFT (1939); ALPHEus T. MAsON, WlLllAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEFJUSTICE (1965);
PAOLO E. COLETfA, THE PREsIDENCY OF WIlliAM HOWARD TAFT (1973); and JUDITH I. ANDERSON,
WIlliAM HOWARD TAFT: AN INTIMATE HISTORY (1981).
2. See WlUJAM A. DEGREGORIO, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF U.S. PREsIDENTS 397-98 (5th ed.
1996).
3. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
4. Sa Antonin Scalia, Originalism: 17u: Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
5. See Carl McGowan, Perspectives on Tqft's Tenure as ChiefJustiu and Their Special Re/evana To~, 55
U. CIN. L. REv. 1143 (1986).
6. Sa Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Modem Marbury Myths, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 891 (1989).
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lower federal court judges-the subject ofjudge Wald's Taft Lecture/
or on Taft's role as a judicial administrator and law reforrner--the
subject of justice O'Connor's and Solicitor General Starr's Taft
Lectures.8 William Howard Taft also served as professor and dean of
this distinguished school, the University of Cincinnati College of Law,
and as the Chancellor Kent Professor at my own horne institution, Yale
University. A lecture honoring this dimension of Taft's career might
well consider the role of universities and other public institutions of
culture-the subject ofDean Bollinger's Taft Lecture.9 Also, let us not
forget that William Howard Taft served as the first civil governor of the
Philippines, provisional governor of Cuba, and secretary of war,
carrying out sensitive diplomatic missions in Panama and japan.10 A
lecture weighing this slice ofTaft's service might well ponder America's
obligations to the world beyond our shores-the subject, perhaps, of
some future Taft Lecture?
I propose to talk about none of the above, and instead, to speak of
the Presidency. To bend a phrase, we might say that some men were
born to be President (John Quincy Adams comes to mind); others
achieved the Presidency-against the odds of their birth, and through
sheer force of will; while still others had the Presidency thrust upon
them. Taft himselfwas an interesting hybrid case: well born (and in the
right state), winning the office in his own right, but without lusting after
it and with considerable help from Theodore Roosevelt, who hand-
picked Taft as his chosen successor. I I Today, I mean to focus on those
who, unlike Taft, simply had the Presidency thrust upon them-on men
who became President without being voted President by the American
people.
I. VICE PRESIDENTIAL ASCENSION AND THE PROBLEM OF
TICKET BALANCING
My story begins with William Henry Harrison, the ninth President of
the United States, and the first President from Ohio. 12 Much of the
7. See Patricia M. Wald, Upslllirs/Downslilirs at the Supreme Court· ImpliJ:aJiDns qfthe 1991 Termfor the
ConslitutWnaI Workqfthe Lower Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 963 (1992).
8. See Sandra Day O'Connor, The]udit;io:ryAct qf1789 and the Ameri.canJudicial Tradition, 59 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1 (1990); Kenneth W. Starr, Wulitun Howard Tqft: The ChUfJustict as Judicial Architect, 60 U. CIN.
L. REv. 963 (1992).
9. Set Lee C. Bollinger, PubliJ: InslitutWns qfCulture and the First AmendmenL' The New Frontier, 63 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1103 (1995).
10. See DEGREGORIO, supra note 2, at 397.
11. Set id. at 388.
12. Seeid. al 137.
HeinOnline -- 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 377 1998-1999
1999] PRESIDENTS WITHOUTMANDATES 377
story of the first century and a half of our national existence can be
distilled in the shift from the early Virginia Presidents to the later Ohio
Presidents, reflecting westward expansion and northern ascendancy.
Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe-Virginians all-
collectively held the Presidency for thirty-two of its first thirty-six years,
but from the ascension of Grant in 1869 to Harding's death in 1923,
Ohioans occupied the White House for more days than all non-Ohioans
put together. 13 Harrison himself personifies this transition. Born in
Virginia (under the British flag), and the son of a man who signed the
Declaration ofIndependence, Harrison later moved to the Northwest
Territory, eventually setding in North Bend, Ohio. 14 With his inaugura-
tion in 1841, Ohio had its first President. But not for long-Harrison
was also the first President to die in office, and after only one month in
the White House. '5 The reins of power fell into the hands of a man
from (you guessed it) Virginia, Vice PresidentJohn Tyler. 16
.. At this point, a nice constitutional question arose. Was Tyler, stricdy
speaking, merely the Vice President acting as President, or did he instead
actually become President upon the death ofHarrison? Tyler, unsurpris-
ingly, took the latter position. The words of the original Constitution on
this question seem fiendishly ambiguous: "In Case of the Removal ofthe
President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to
discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall
devolve on the Vice President."I? Did the words "the Same" in this
Devolution Clause mean the "said Office" itself, or merely "the Powers
and Duties" of the office?
At first we might wonder what would turn on such a hairsplit. Surely
not Tyler's formal authority to, say, veto laws-for even under a narrow
reading, such authority seems obviously included as among the "Powers
and Duties" of the Presidency. Nevertheless, Tyler's exuberant use of
the veto provoked torrents of criticism and even serious calls for his
impeachment.18 Whereas his predecessors had used the veto pen rather
sparingly-confining most of their vetoes to instances in which they
deemed bills unconstitutional or invasions of executive turf-Tyler felt
freer to veto bills that he thought were merely bad policy. Perhaps a
President with a strong and personal mandate from the American
. 13. Set id. at 3,39,56,74,261-442.
14. Set id. at 140.
15. Set id. at 144.
16. Set w.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, d. 6.
18. Set CONGo GLOBE, 27th Congo 144 (3d Sess. 1843); WILFRED E. BINKLEY, PREsIDENT AND
CONGRESS 118-20 (1962); CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 770 (3d cd. 1982);
Charles Black, Some ThoughJ.s on the Veto, 40 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 87, 90-91.
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people could have expanded the office this way with more plausibility,
butJohn Tyler was no AndrewJackson. No one had voted for Tyler as
President and he was derisively referred to by his many critics as "His
Accidency" ( a pun on "His Excellency").19 Indeed, Tyler's policy views
were in general sharply at odds with those of the man the people had
chosen, namely, Harrison. Later in my lecture, I shall return to the
global problem exemplified by the Tyler ascension, a problem created
by tickets and ticket balancing.
IfTyler's formal powers did not tum on whether he was actually the
President, or merely the Vice President acting as President, what else
was at stake? Perhaps his tenure in office? Probably not. At the end
of the above-quoted Devolution Clause, the Constitution contains
language that the devolution (of the office, or of the powers thereof)
would end when "the Disability shall be removed, or a President shall
be elected.,,20 These words clearly contemplated the possibility of a
special election in the following situation. Ifboth the President and the
Vice President were to die, Congress could by law designate an officer
to be a statutory successor, who would simply act as a caretaker until a
special off-year presidential election was held, whose winner would serve
out a residual term until the next regularly scheduled inauguration.21
When Congress implemented this clause by adopting the Presidential
Succession Act of 1792,22 it provided for just such a special off-year
election, to pick a new President who would have a clear mandate. But
this Act applied only in the event of statutory succession triggered by
double death-of both the President and Vice President. Only by an odd
grammatical contortion of the Devolution Clause can we read its last
clause as applicable to Vice President-successors as opposed to statutory
(double death) successors.
.Thus at the end of the day, it seems that Tyler was entided to wield
all presidential powers for three years and eleven months, regardless of
whether, stricdy speaking, he had become President. However, at least
two things were at stake. First was the issue of salary. A presidential
salary was not quite part of the "powers and duties" of the presidency,
but it surely was part of the "office" itself, which Tyler claimed as his
own. Calling himself President, Tyler thereby claimed the higher
presidential salary (which ofcourse under the Constitution was fixed for
the entire term, and thus immune from any congressional carrot-and-
19. Su PAULF. BOLLER,JR., PRF.'lIDENTIALANECDOTES 97 (1981).
20. U.S. CaNsT. art. II, § 1, d. 6.
21. Su Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Pre.ridmtiaJ Succession Act UnconstiJutioTlll1?, 48
STAN. L. REv. 118, 133, 138 n.lH (1995).
22. Act of Mar. 1,1792,1 Stat. 239 (repealed 1886).
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stick reprisals for his maddening vetoes).23 Second was the issue of
formal tide itself. We are apt to miss the import of such a seemingly
small formality in our highly informal world of 'Jimmys" and "Bills"
rather than "Mister Presidents," but the formal issue of tide loomed
larger in an earlier America surrounded by regimes bulging with dukes
and earls and barons and counts and kings.24 Two separate clauses of
the federal Constitution condemned "tides of nobility"25 and a third
anti-tide provision passed Congress as a proposed constitutional
amendment in 1810, only to fail at the state ratification stage.26 From
a modem perspective, an unfathomable amount ofwrangling occurred
at the founding over the issue of the President's tide.. Washington let it
be known that he would prefer to be formally addressed as "His High
Mightiness, the President of the United States and Protector of their
Liberties,,,27 but the First Congress ultimately opted for the more
republican-sounding "Mister President."
With Tyler having fixed in place a practical precedent resolving the
open textual question, later Vice Presidents also proclaimed themselves
Presidents upon the deaths of their running mates. After Harrison, the
next presidential death occurred in 1850 when the Virginia-born
President Zachary Taylor passed away in office, whereupon Vice
President Millard Fillmore became President Millard Fillmore. Then
came Lincoln's assassination in 1865, with the reins of presidential
power falling into the hands of Andrew johnson.28 Like john Tyler
before him, Andrew johnson insisted on wielding the powers of the
presidency-especially the veto pen-with exuberance, even though he
had no personal mandate, and indeed came to stand for things quite at
odds with what Lincoln would likely have stood for. 29
Opponents were of course outraged. Who did this fellow think he
was, this self-proclaimed President wielding such awesome power by
23. Sa U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, d. 7 (''The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services,
a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have
been elected ....").
24. Sa GORDON WOOD, THE RADICAliSM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991).
25. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, d. 8 (barring federal titles of nobility); id. § 10, d. 1 (barring state
titles of nobility). The Artides of Confederation imposed similar restrictions on both Congress and the
states-a fact that is quite striking when we recall how few limits that document generally imposed on so-
called "sovereign" states. Sa ART. OF CONFED., art. VI, d. 1 (1781).
26. This amendment would have stripped U:S. citizenship from any American accepting a foreign
title of nobility. AmmdmmJ Not Ratified (visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://www.house.gov/Constitutionall
Amendnotrat.html>.
27. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE.UNITED STATES 163
(1913).
28. Sa DEGREGORIO, supra note 2, at 241.
29. Sa id. at 253.
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dint ofone man's bullet rather than all men's ballots? For the first time
in history, Congress overrode a major presidential veto and eventually
impeached the president, with a strong majority (but not the necessary
two-thirds) voting to convict.30 Here again we see the general problem
raised by ticket balancing-with Americans voting for presidential
policy X, and ending up with presidential policy Y.
But before we ponder that problem more generally, let us trace to its
end the other thread of the Tyler precedent-the question of whether
a Vice President actually becomes President. When the elected
President actually dies, and dies quickly-as did Harrison, Taylor, and
Lincoln--we have seen that very little turns on the question. Salary and
title are more than trivial but less than momentous. But the next
presidential assassination showed that a great deal more might be at
stake. In 1880 the nation electedJames Garfield-ofOhio, ofcourse. 31
Four months after assuming office, Garfield was shot in a train station
by a dissatisfied office-seeker.32 Garfield did not die immediately, but
lingered on for months, waxing and waning in bed. Meanwhile the
nation listed, rudderless, without a leader at the helm.33
Why didn't Vice President Chester A. Arthur do something, and step
in temporarily, given that the President was obviously disabled? In large
part, because ofthe Tyler precedent.34 Suppose Arthur did step forward
and start acting as President. Under the Tyler precedent, wouldn't
Arthur thereby become President? But then what would happen if
Garfield later recovered (as for a time seemed quite likely)? If Arthur
had already become President, would Garfield be out ofluck (and out
of a job)? If so, Arthur would have in effect staged a coup, and
permanently ousted Garfield. And two further complicating factors
were at work. First, it was far from clear exactly who should decide
whether Garfield was indeed "disabUed]" within the meaning of the
Constitution. Garfield alone? Arthur alone? The Cabinet? The
Congress? The Supreme Court? Second, Garfield and Arthur came
from opposite wings of the Republican party, representing different
policies.35 Garfield seemed to smile upon a professional civil service,
while Arthur believed that government jobs should reward the party
faithful. In effect, Republicans ticket-balanced a mugwump and a
30. See id. at 254.
31. See id. at 295.
32. See id. at 302.
33. See HENRY F. GRAFF, THE PREsIDENTS: A REFERENCE HISTORY 277-78 (2d ed. 1996).
34. For a superb general discussion, seeJOHN D. F'EERICK, FROM FAIUNG HANDS: THE STORY
OF PREsIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 117-39 (1965).
. 35. Sa PAUL F. BOCCER, PREsIDEN1lALANEcDOTES 168, 173 (1981); DEGREGORJO, mpra note
2, at 298, 310-11.
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stalwart. Garfield paid dearly for his perceived views. Upon arrest,
Garfield's assassin told police, "I did it and will go to jail for it. I am a
stalwart, and Arthur will be President.,,36 On his person, police found
a letter addressed "To the White House" proclaiming Garfield's death
a "sad ... political necessity" to "unite the Republican party" and a
letter addressed to Arthur making various recommendations for Cabinet
reshuffling.37 Arthur of course had had nothing to do with this mad-
man, but for the Vice President to move in too soon would indeed look
like a coup ofsorts. Thus, Arthur did nothing, and months went by with
the country effectively without a President. Garfield eventually died,
and under the Tyler precedent, Arthur thereupon became President.38
A similar situation arose in 1919. In 1912, Woodrow Wilson became
the first Virginia-born President since Zachary Taylor, by defeating an
incumbent Ohio President-one William Howard Taft-in a three way
race that also included Teddy Roosevelt.39 Late in Wilson's second
term, he suffered a serious stroke that spelled the practical end of his
presidency.40 Once again, the Vice President did nothing, in part
because of the uncertainty created by the Tyler precedent. Read
narrowly, the precedent might mean that when a President died, his
Vice President became President; but that in the event of disability, a
Vice President could only act as President until the disability subsided.
But read broadly, perhaps the precedent might mean that the moment
a Vice President started wielding presidential powers, he irreversibly
became President. With so much at stake, and litde definitive legal
guidance, Vice Presidents acted with extreme caution.
Today, of course, definitive guidance does exist, in the form of the .
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, proposed and ratified after the assassination
of John Kennedy and the ascension of Lyndon J ohnson:H The
Amendment makes clear that when the President dies or resigns or is
removed from office-and only then-does the Vice President in fact
"become President.,,42 Otherwise, ifthe President is merely disabled
(perhaps only temporarily) from exercising the powers and duties of his
office, then the Vice President may step in and "assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President,,43 without prejudice to the Presi-
dent's ability to resume his post when he has recovered from his
36. FEERICK, supra note, 34 at 118.
37. [d. at 118-19.
38. See DEGREGORIO, supra note 2, at 303.
39. See it/. at 415.
40. See it/. at 425.
41. See it/. at 576.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § I.
43. [d. § 4 (emphasis added).
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disability. The Amendment also provides a clear framework for
determining whether the President is in fact disabled, and for how long.
Its biggest flaws are that it provides no satisfactory mechanism for
determining vice presidential disability, and that in the event ofa vacant or
disabled vice presidency, its rules for determining presidential disability
will not work.44-
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment does one more noteworthy thing: in
the event ofa vice presidential vacancy (created either by vice presiden-
tial death, removal, or resignation on the one hand, or by vice presiden-
tial ascension to a vacant Presidency on the other) the President may
nominate a candidate to flll the vacancy, who must then be voted on by
the entire Congress before becoming Vice President4-5 This is of course
the mechanism by which Gerald Ford became Vice President (and later
President) in the mid 1970s, and by which President Ford in tum paved
the way for Nelson Rockefeller to become Vice President.4-6 Although
the American people do not directly vote in this process, their represen-
tatives in Congress do vote, and thereby confer a direct and personal
mandate upon the Vice President.
It is precisely this mandate that is generally lacking in ordinary
elections of a Vice President Generally, American voters are not
allowed to vote for President and Vice President separately in a process
that would give each one a direct and personal mandate to govern
(though the mandate of the Vice President would obviously be a
contingent one). Rather, voters are confronted with a single ticket, and
must take the package as a whole. There is nothing in the Constitution
that requires this way of voting; it is purely a matter of state law. And
there is good reason to question the current and traditional way of
voting for tickets. Here we return to the other thread of the Harrison-
Tyler succession problem-the problem of ticket balancing.
The problem, simply put, is this: Americans vote for a President at
the top of a ticket, without much attention to the Vice President at the
bottom of the ticket So long as nothing happens to the President, all .
this may be harmless enough, but what ifsomething does happen to the
President? Having voted for A, the American people end up with B. B
lacks a personal mandate to govern, yet has the legal right to wield all
the awesome power of the office. The situation is even worse when
parties balance tickets with candidates from opposite party wings, so that
the electorate votes for one set of policies and ends up with a very
different set
44. See Amar & Amar, supra note 21, at 139.
45. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
46. See DEGREGORIO, supra note 2, at 592, 610.
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Elsewhere, Vik Amar and I have explored the theoretical problems
of ascending Vice Presidents who come to the Presidency with neither
a personal nor a political mandate from the people.47 Today, in this
place, let me try to illustrate this theoreticalpoint anecdotally, with four
examples in American history ofticket balancing gone bad. Each of the
four examples, interestingly, has an Ohio connection. First, as we have
seen, democracy and constitutional structure were not well served when
the people voted for President Harrison and ended up with President
Tyler, who nearly provoked a constitutional crisis.48 Lest we simply
personalize all this, and heap the blame on Tyler, let us note that
virtually the same thing happened when the people voted for President
Lincoln, and ended up with PresidentJohnson, who did indeed provoke
a severe constitutional crisis.49 (In a few moments, I shall higWight the
role of Ohio in this crisis, in the person of Ohio Senator Benjamin
Wade, who would have become President hadJohnson been convicted
by the Senate in his impeachment trial.) The situation with Presidents
Garfield and Arthur seems even worse-here the ticket balancing
actually induced an assassination.50 In such a situation, Arthur was in
a poor position to lead the country, had strong leadership been
necessary; his occupancy of the office was a genuine embarrassment.51
In 1905; the country once again voted for one kind of Republi-
can-Ohio's William McKinley--only to get a very different kind as
President, Theodore Roosevelt.52 Although Roosevelt turned out to be
a man of great ability, this seems like blind luck more than structural
genius.. Precisely because Americans never vote direcdy for a Vice
President, parties have weak incentives to fill this bottom slot with a
truly worthy figure, and many talented politicians shun the assignment.
The solution, Vik Amar and I have suggested elsewhere,53 is to let
Americans vote direcdy for Vice President. In the event of the Presi-
dent's death or disability, the Vice President will be able to lead more
effectively precisely because he will have already received a personal
vote of confidence from the nation he must lead. Parties will be more
likely to field one of their most worthy candidates for the job precisely
because separate election will focus the voters more carefully on the
47. Sa Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, Prt.ridmJ Q¥'!Yle?, 78 VA. L. REv. 913 (1992).
48. Su DEGREGORIO, supra note 2, at 156.
49. Sa id. at 254.
50. Many people believe that lincoln's assassins were similarly motivated-though once again, there
is litde evidence that the Vice President himselfwas in any way involved in the plot.
5!. Sa DEGREGORIO, supra note 2, at 313, 315.
52. Sa id. at 362, 367, 380-8!.
53. Sa Amar & Amar, supra note 47. Professor Richard Friedman made this suggestion even earlier.
Sa Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on IN VIa-ltt.sitlen9, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1703, 1726-29 (1988).
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bottom of the ticket. Talented and ambitious politicians will be more
willing to accept the number two spot if it comes with a personal
mandate from the entire nation-which no other politician in America
(aside from the President) enjoys. Even if the President stays healthy in
office, the Vice President will be in a stronger position to run for
President on his own later on.
II. STATUTORY SUCCESSION
Having pondered some of the implications ofour constitutional scheme
ofsuccession, let us now note some ofthe features ofour statutory scheme
ofsuccession, which would swing into operation in the event ofdouble
death or disability-of both President and Vice President. Double
death or disability has never yet happened-and after the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment it is less likely to happen, because we now have a mecha-
nism for filling a vacant Vice Presidency. But if it were to happen, the
stakes would be even more serious, since by hypothesis, the nation
would have lost (at least temporarily) its two highest leaders.
Here are the words of the Constitution's Devolution Clause on the
subject: "Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such
Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.,,54 There are two fundamental questions we
must answer in the event ofdouble death. First, who should take over?
Second, for how long? Over the centuries, Congress has enacted three
different succession statutes, each ofwhich offered different answers to
these two questions. None of these statutes has answered both questions
correctly, and the current statute is a disaster--a true constitutional
accident waiting to happen.
Under the Act of 1792, as we have seen, a statutory successor simply
would act as a caretaker, holding the office until a special off-year
presidential election could be arranged, whose winner would immedi-
ately take over the reins for the remainder of the deceased President's
term. This Act, I suggest, got the "how long" question right. Precisely
because a statutory successor will lack a strong mandate from the
American people, the successor should simply hold down the fort for the
minimum amount of time necessary to run a smooth election that will
generate a leader who does have such a mandate to hold the nation's
(and today, the world's) most powerful office. But the 1792 Act got the
54-. u.s. CONST. art II, § 1, d. 6.
HeinOnline -- 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 385 1998-1999
1999] PRESIDENTS WITHOUTMANDATES 385
"who" question wrong. It designated the Senate president pro tempore
as the caretaker officer. AsJames Madison pointed out at the time, this
designation is unconstitutional.55 Members ofthe House and Senate are
not, stricdy speaking, "officers of the United States"-for example,
legislators cannot be impeached. Only "officers" of the United States
may be designated as statutory successors under a proper reading of the
Devolution Clause; the clause plainly contemplates that a Cabinet
officer picked by the President, and not a legislator, should hold down
the fort.
Elsewhere, Vik Amar and I have offered a detailed analysis of why
Madison was absolutely right56-and I do not propose to rehash all of
our reasons today. But standing here in Ohio, I do want to highlight a
few of the most vicious features of legislative (as opposed to Cabinet)
succession, because these features direcdy involve this state, and these
features helped lead to the repeal of the Act of 1792. When Andrew
Johnson was impeached by the House, and tried by the Senate in 1868,
the Vice Presidency was of course vacant.57 (It had been vacated by
Johnson himself, and prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, no means
existed to fIll the vacancy.) Thus, if the Senators who sat in solemn
judgment over Johnson, in a judicial proceeding under oath, were to
find him guilty ofhigh crimes and misdemeanors and remove him from
office, the 1792 Act would swing into operation. And who would move
into the White House? The Senate President pro tempore, and leader
of the Senate opposition to Johnson-Senator Ben Wade of Ohio.
Indeed, while sitting in solemn judgment over Johnson, Wade had
already been picking his Cabinet.58 Thus the Act of 1792 had the
obvious potential for corrupting judicial judgment, effectively making
Wade a judge in his own case, giving him an obvious conflict of interest.
Such an arrangement is hardly calculated to inspire confidence and
reduce cynicism among ordinary Americans. Had Wade actually
succeeded in succeeding, what kind of mandate would he have had,
coming into power in such a smelly way? Legislative succession also
smacked of creeping Parliamentarianism; transforming the Founders'
judicial model of impeachment into a political vote of no confidence,
unraveling the fixed presidential term prescribed by the Constitution,
and allowing the legislature to usurp the power that the Framers so
55. See 14 PAPERSOFJAMF.'J MADISON 235 (RobertA Rutland et a1. eds., 1983) (concerning a letter
to Edmund Pendleton dated February 21, 1792).
56. See Amar & Amar, supra note 21.
57. See DEGREGORIO, supra note 2, at 252.
58. SetJOHND. FEERlCK, THE TwENTY-FIITH AMENDMENT 214 (2d ed. 1992).
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carefully sought to deny them-the unilateral power to pick their own
leader as President.
Repulsed by the sordidness of the Wade affair, and persuaded that
Madison may well have been right on the constitutional question,
Congress in 1886 repealed the 1792 Act and replaced it with a scheme
providing for Cabinet officer succession.59 This statute got the "who"
question right-a fallen President's fort should be held down by the
person that the President selected to carry his flag. But the 1886
question got the "how long" question wrong by failing to specify that a
Cabinet officer should simply act as a caretaker until a proper national
election could be held. Given that Cabinet officers are not direcdy
elected, they lack a strong personal mandate, and should act as
President for as short a time as possible. (Of course, such a caretaker
officer could choose to run in the special election, and thereby win a
mandate to stay in office until the end of the deceased President's term.)
In 1947, Congress changed the statute once again, giving us the worst
of both worlds-truly a wrong-wrong result.60 The 1947 Act restored
legislative succession-but put the Speaker of the House ahead of the
Senate President pro tempore. And it utterly abandoned the idea ofa
special election. The supporters of the 1947 Act denounced Cabinet
succession because Cabinet officers are unelected, and thus have an
insufficient democratic mandate. I concede that there is some truth
here; this is precisely why a statutory successor simply should serve as
a caretaker until a new election can be held that will give someone a
democratic mandate. The alternative solution proposed by the 1947 law
fails to solve the problem. A single Senator or House member may be
elected, but not by the nation. A President must have not simply a
democratic mandate but a national one. And that mandate cannot simply
come from fellow legislators unless we are to revert to the very system
ofunilateral legislative selection ofchiefexecutive, a la Parliament, that
our entire system of separation of powers was painstakingly crafted to
repudiate.
Here is what all this means today. Under the current version of the
1947 succession statute, the foreman ofthe constitutional grandjury that
is charged with overseeing the President and the Vice President has a
blatant conflict of interest. If that grand jury (that is, the House of
Representatives) indicts (i.e., impeaches), then the foreman (i.e., the
Speaker of the House) moves one huge step closer to the Oval Office.
One hears a lot of talk about impeachment these days. Would public
59. See Act orJan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, § 1,24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
60. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1994).
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confidence be enhanced, and public cynicism put to rest, if Newt
Gingrich or Strom Thurmond-yes, he is the Senate President pro
tempore-were to move into the Oval Office after an impeachment or
two? Would such a statutory successor have the requisite legitimacy to
govern when there are such strong arguments that the very statute that
swept him into office is patently unconstitutional? If a bomb had gone
offin February 1997,just months after Americans voted for Democrats
Clinton and Gore, could the country easily accept that for the nextfour
years they should be governed by Republican President Gingrich or
Thurmond? Why do we bother holding national presidential elections
ifour law treats them with such evident disrespect? .
III. ELECTORAL COlLEGE GUTCHES -
Here is another little-known pocket of law that is a constitutional
accident waiting to happen. Suppose our hypothetical bomb had gone
offafter Democrats Clinton and Gore had been overwhelmingly elected
in November 1996, but hours before the scheduled meeting of the
electoral college in December. Suppose, in our hypothetical, that
Clinton had been killed. Many states purport to legally bind electors to
vote for the-ticket to which they pledged themselves on Election Day.
Even if those laws are unconstitutional or unenforceable, imagine that
most electors-reeling from the news, and without much time to consult
legal experts-simply cast their electoral votes for Clinton (as pledged)
- under the assumption that on Inauguration Day, Clinton's running
mate, Gore, would take up the reins. In this event, who would become
President inJanuary? One possible answer--you should all be shocked
to learn-is not Gore, and it is not Clinton. It is Bob Dole-yes, the
man the country had just voted down.
How could this be? Once again, our story takes us back to Ohio. In
November 1872, Ohioan Ulysses Grant defeated Horace Greeley in the
race for the Presidency.61 Shortly after the election but before the
meeting of the electoral college, a brokenhearted Greeley died.62 Some
electors nevertheless cast their votes for Greeley, as pledged-but when
Congress met to tally these votes, as provided for in the Constitution,
Congress refused to count the votes for Greeley.63 Little turned on the
issue then-after all, Greeley lost no matter what-but the situation is
very different in our hypothetical, where the decedent won. Were
61. Su DEGREGORIO, supra note 2, at 267.
62. Su id.
63. Su id.
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Congress to blindly follow the Greeley precedent in our hypothetical,
they would refuse to count the votes for Clinton, and the only one with
any eligible electoral college votes for President would be-yes-Bob
Dole.
Elsewhere, I have suggested that the obviously sensible result in this
situation is that AI Gore and not Bob Dole should be sworn in as
President,64- and there is a simple way to get to this result. It may sound
counterintuitive at first, but we should simply count the votes of a dead
man as ifhe were alive. The Greeley precedent was ill-considered and
should not be followed. On this approach, Clinton's votes count; he
wins when the electoral votes are tallied; and as he is unable to
discharge the office on Inauguration Day, his Vice President, AI Gore,
becomes President.
I cannot here go into all the details and permutations ofmy analysis;65
but there is another accident waiting to happen that is even easier to fix.
Suppose our hypothetical bomb had gone off one day before the
popular election. What should we do? The obvious answer-arid it can
easily be accomplished by statute-is to postpone the election so that the
national parties and the candidates and the people can absorb the
situation. Ifsubstitute candidates must be fielded, let this be done before
the people vote rather than after, so that the people will know which
precise persons they are voting for, and will accept as fully legitimate
whichever candidates ultimately win the election.
Thus far in this lecture, I have suggested that a big problem arises
when the people vote for A and end up with B. This is a problem even
when A and B are running mates-though I have suggested that the
problem could be dramatically lessened ifvoters were allowed to vote
for A and B individually rather than as a ticket. With a separate vote on
the Vice Presidency, if the people get B upon A's death, then they are
getting precisely what they voted for, and voted for unambiguously. But
now suppose they vote forpar~ A and get party B instead-they vote for
Clinton and get Gingrich or Thurmond or Dole. I have suggested that
these are scenarios to be avoided.
If you are with me so far, the next step is logically simple, but more
constitutionally difficult: we must abolish the electoral college itself.
The reason ofcourse is that under the electoral college, more Americans
may vote for A, but end up with B instead as their President. This has
not yet happened in this century, but if and when it does, will the
64. &e Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, VICe Presidents, and Death: Closing the ConsWuwn's Succession Gap,
48 ARK. L. REv. 215 (1995). .
65. For much more discussion and analysis of the issues raised in this section, see id.
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loser/winner have genuine legitimacy? Ifnot, then shouldn't we abolish
the electoral college before the damage is done? .
Ifwe consider the last two times a man with fewer popular votes than
his rival ended up winning in the electoral college, we will find that in
both instances, the winner lacked a certain democratic legitimacy in the
eyes of many. Both winners, Rutherford B. Hayes and Benjamin
Harrison, came from the state of--you guessed it-Ghio. I must confess
that I may be slightly prejudiced against Hayes-he was after all a
Harvard Law School graduate, and I am a Yale man. And there were
considerable electoral college machinations that further clouded his
election. But the simple fact that his rival evidently received more
popular votes helped contribute to a widespread sense that his occu-
pancy of the White House was less than fully legitirriate-a sense
reflected in cruel nicknames like "His Fraudulency," "the Usurper,"
and "Rutherfraud B. Hayes.,,66 Benjamin Harrison-the grandson of
old William Henry Harrison, and born on the family homestead in
North Bend-displaced Grover Cleveland in 1888 even though
Cleveland won more votes, and the very next time the people were
consulted they promptly put Cleveland back in the White House, in the
rematch election of1892.67
The weakness of the Presidency between Lincoln and Wilson had
often been noted, and we can now see that a considerable part of that
weakness consisted in a series of Presidents without popular mandates,
due to death and the quirks of the electoral college.68 Today, America's
role in the world is much more central than it was then, and the powers
of the Presidency are far greater. Precisely because of this, the legiti-
macy lapses I have higWighted today seem more worrisome.
Unlike some of the other things I have been proposing to-
day-separate election ofVice Presidents, repeal ofthe 1947 Succession
Act, repudiation of the Greeley precedent, and postponement of
presidential elections in the event of election-eve tragedies-fixing the
electoral college cannot be done simply by statute. It will require a
constitutional amendment.
But amendment is exactly what is called for here; the reasons that
made the electoral college sensible in the eighteenth century no longer
apply.69 The Framers emphatically did not want a President dependent
66. See BOlLER, supra note 19, at 163.
67. See DEGREGORIO, supra note 2, at 337,346.
68. For a somewhat similar suggestion, see CARL N. DEGLER, THE AGE OF TIlE ECONOMIC
REVOLUTION 1876.1900, at 89-93 (2d ed. 1977).
69. The material presented over the next few paragraphs is borrowed from Akhil Reed Amar, A
ConstiJutionaJ Accident Waiting 10 Happm, 12 CONST. COMM. 143 (1995).
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on the legislature, so they rejected a parliamentary model in which the
legislature would pick its own leader as prime minister and chief
executive officer. How, then, should the President be picked? The
visionaryJames Wilson proposed direct national popular election, but
the.scheme was deemed unworkable for three reasons. First, very few
candidates would have truly continental reputations among ordinary
citizens; ordinary folk across the vast continent would not have enough
good information to choose intelligendy among national figures. 7o
Second, a populist Presidency was seen as dangerous-inviting
demagoguery and possibly dictatorship as one man claimed to embody
the Voice of the American People.71 Third, national election would
upset a careful balance ofpower among states.72 Because the South did
not let blacks vote, southern voices would count less in a direct national
election. A state could increase its clout by recklessly extending its
franchise-for example, if (heaven forbid!) a state let women vote, it
could double its weight in a direct national election. Under the electoral
college system, by contrast, a state would get a fixed number ofelectoral
votes whether its franchise was broad or narrow-indeed, whether or
not it let ordinary voters pick electors.
None ofthese arguments works today. Improvements in communica-
tions technology, and the rise of political parties, make possible direct
election and a populist Presidency-de facto, that is our scheme today.
Blacks and women are no longer selectively disenfranchised, and states
no longer play key roles in defining the electorate or in deciding whether
to give the voters a direct voice in choosing electors. Direct national
election would encourage states to encourage voters to vote on Election
Day; but today, this hardly seems a strong reason to oppose direct
election. Ingenious, indirect, sophisticated arguments made on behalf
of the electoral college by clever theorists these days are legion-but
almost all are make-weight. If the scheme is so good, why doesn't any
U.S. state, or any foreign nation, copy it? A low plurality winner in a
three- or four-way race is possible even with the electoral college; and
could be avoided in a direct national election by single transferable
voting (with voters listing their second and third choices on the ballot,
in effect combining the "first heat" and "run off" elections into a single
transaction).
The only two real arguments against abolition of the electoral college
sound in federalism and inertia. Only federalism can explain why we
70. See MICHAEL P. RICCARDS, THE FEROCIOUS ENGINE OF DEMOCRACY: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 18 (1995).
71. Said. at 18,25-27.
72. See id.
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should use an electoral college to pick Presidents but not governors. But
it is hard to see what the federalism argument is todqy. The specter of
the national government administering a national election, I confess,
does not give me the cold sweats. A razor-thin popular vote margin
might occasion a national recount, but states now manage recounts all
the time, and new technology will make counting and recounting much
easier in the future. (And today, a razor-thin electoral college margin
may require recounts in a number of closely contested states even if
there is a clear national popular winner.)
Inertial, Burkean, arguments take two forms. First, the argument
goes, a change in presidential selection rules would radically change the
game in ways hard to foresee: Candidates would not care about
winning states-only votes-and campaign strategies might change
dramatically and for the worse. But it is hard to see why. Given that,
historically, the electoral college leader has also tended to be the popular
vote leader, the strategy for winning should not change dramatically if
we switch from one measure to the other. This sets up the second
inertial point: The dreaded specter of a clear popular loser becoming
the electoral college winner has not materialized since Hayes and
Harrison last century--so "Why worry"'? But that is what someone
might say after three trigger pulls in Russian Roulette. One day, we will
end up with a clear loser President-clear beyond any quibbles about
uncertain ballots. And the question will be, will this loser/winner be
seen as legitimate at home and abroad? If our modem national
democratic ethos, when focused on the thing, would balk at a byzantine
system that defies the people's choice on Election Day, true Burkean
theory would seem to argue against the electoral college. If We the
People would amend the Constitution after the loser President
materializes-and I should think we would-why are we now just
waiting for the inevitable accident to happen?
IV. CONCLUSION
In my lecture today, I have tried to honor not simply a man, but also
a place-his home, his state-by paying particular attention to the Ohio
Presidents. I think I have mentioned them all-Harrison, Grant, Hayes,
Garfield, Harrison, McKinley, Taft, and Harding--but I should like to
close by paying more homage to President Taft, and noting his
connection to two other Ohio Presidents. First, I should be remiss in not
giving credit to President Harding for one of his finest moments as
President: the appointment of Taft as ChiefJustice. (Perhaps it also
bears note that in the election of 1920 that brought Harding to the
White House, his Democratic opponent was a fellow Ohioan, James
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Cox. This election was one of the few times in American history that
both candidates haled from the same state, a striking fact confirming the
political centrality of Ohio in this era.)73 Second, a few facts about
President Grant. Grant tapped Alphonso Taft, our honoree's father, as
secretary ofwar and, later, attorney general.74 Grant himself had been
asked by PresidentJohnson to replace secretary ofwar Edwin Stanton;
and ofcourse it was precisely this set ofevents that lay at the heart of the
Tenure of Office Act and the impeachment ofAndrewJohnson. And
these issues, in tum, were at the heart of ChiefJustice Taft's great
decision in Myers v. United States,75 a decision that no doubt reflected the
lessons Taft had learned in his own service as secretary ofwar and, later,
as President. .
The great Myers opinion reminds us of the awesome powers of the
Presidency. In light of those awesome powers, my lecture today in
honor of the author ofMyers has tried to stress the importance ofvesting
the office in someone who has earned the respect of the people btjiJre
becoming President. Some have criticized Taft's performance as
President, while others have defended him. Whatever we might think
ofthis debate, my lecture today in honor ofTaft should make one thing
clear: unlike so many others, here was a man who had earned the right
to be President.
73. See DEGREGORIO, supra note 2, at 437.
74. See id. at 269·70.
75. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
